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OSHA has created final benzene regulations after extensive rulemakings on two occasions, 1978 and 1987.
These standards have been the subject of extensive litigation for nearly 20 years. This article examines in
detail the conceptual underpinnings of the Benzene Case, (which was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1980) in light ofU.S. administrative law precedents that have set limits upon administrative discretion
under the test for "substantial evidence" and the "hard look doctrine." This article also addresses recent
developments inthewake oftheBenzene Caseandtheir implications forbenzene regulations followingthe
"significant risk" doctrine in thatcase. This article briefly describes othernational, regional, and interna-
tional laws governing the use ofbenzene. This article concludes that the revisions ofthe benzene regula-
tion andsubsequent rulemakingprovide substantial evidenceofscientific underpinnings for regulatory ac-
tion andthatlawsfromothernationsreflectaninternational consensusthatoccupational exposure tobenzene
is a proper subject ofregulation. Such regulations and policies are therefore likely to withstand scrutiny
and remain enforceable as widely accepted norms.
Introduction
The carcinogenic and mutagenic characteristics ofben-
zene have been the subject of extensive scientific re-
search; decisions based upon these data have given rise
tolitigation aswell as public controversy. In response to
these developments aroundthe world, benzene hasbeen
regulated in the U.S., Canada, Europe, andunderinter-
national standards. In particular, benzene regulations in
the U.S. have been the subjectofextensivelitigation and
research for nearly 20 years.
The case law and regulation ofbenzene therefore rep-
resent an important dimension ofits use. Because ofthe
power of government to implement standards and en-
force thelaw, legal considerations ultimately affectwork-
ers' daily exposure, despite the inherent differences be-
tween law and science. Regardless of whether future
developments recognize athresholdofsafety forbenzene
use, an industrial users ofbenzene need to understand
these laws and regulations when designingindustrial hy-
giene programs. In addition, there remains the potential
forapplication ofthese principles to other substances or
environmental laws (which are beyond the scope ofthis
article).
Drawing upon federal statutes, case law and treaties
regulating benzene, this article notes the end ofthe era
of "unbridled discretion" for agencies that regulate the
use oftoxic and hazardous substances, as well as an end
to the threshold question, whether occupational exposure
tobenzene is sufficiently dangerous torequire regulation.
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In the U.S., the desire to regulate substances has been
balanced against enhanced scientific evidence and tem-
peredby the constraints upon economicfeasibility in in-
dustry. This article therefore concludes that a far-
reaching transnational trend exists, favoring cautious
regulations that are unlikely to be overturned.
OSHA's Benzene Regulations
Present Standard for Occupational
Exposure to Benzene
The U.S. standard for occupational exposure to ben-
zene(1)was adoptedunderthe "Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970" ("OSH Act") (2). It authorizes the
Secretary of Labor to promulgate "occupational safety
and health standards" and established the Occupational
Safety andHealthAdministration(OSHA) toperformthe
agency's mission. Such standards must be "reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe orhealthful em-
ployment or places ofemployment", under s3(8) (3). Ac-
cording to traditional U.S. administrative law (4), agency
decisions must not be "arbitrary and capricious" (5), and
mustbe supportedby "substantial evidence" (6)justify-
ing the agency's policies, in order to meet the test set
forth in s3(8).
The present permissible exposure limit, (PEL) for oc-
cupational exposure to benzene is 1 ppm(7), [actionlevel
of0.5 timeweighted average (TWA)], with a short-term
exposure limit(STEL) of5ppmaveraged over 15 min to
a confidence interval of95% + 25%. Under the present
rule, employers are required to establish "regulated
areas" if airborne concentration can reasonably be ex-J. L. FEITSHANS
pectedto exceedpermitted exposures(8). In addition, the
standard requires employee notification of monitoring
results; establishment and implementation of a written
program to reduce employee exposure with engineering
and work practice controls; respiratory protection, pro-
tective clothing, medical surveillance, recordkeeping; and
regularly scheduled medical examinations (including
urine sample in the event of emergency exposures).
These technical provisions are identical to the earlier
final rule for benzene exposure (9) issued by OSHA in
1978, which was subjected to extensive litigation. Be-
cause ofmany subtle butimportant minorrevisions, the
prior final rule was about two-thirds shorter than the
present rule. The original final rule had fewer exemp-
tions; provided detailed protection against dermal and
eye contact; andrequired quarterly measurementsunless
exposure was below the action level (and "at least
monthly" ifin excess ofthe PEL), new "initial monitor-
ing" in the event ofa change in the process, and swifter
examination ofaurine sample in the event ofemergency
exposure (10).
The present standard provides workers withimportant
job protections, such as Medical Removal Protection
(MRP) based upon hematological findings outlined in
paragraphs (i) (8) (i) and (ii) (11). MRP provides workers
with the right to transfer and rate retention upon recom-
mendation by a hematologist/internist. It also requires
enhanced employee education and training, consistent
with the requirements of OSHA's Hazard Communica-
tion standard(12). Inaddition, the present standard pro-
vides clearer definition of "representative" sample of
TWAexposure; allows alongerperiod oftime before em-
ployee notification ofmonitoringresults; removedthe re-
quirement that notification andcompliance plans be read-
ily available to employees attheworksite; exemptsfrom
medical surveillance certainemployeeswho facelow ex-
posures; and reduces the number of required regular
medical examinations. Thesemodifications were designed
to streamline progress towards worker protection.
Regulatory History of Benzene Exposure
in the U.S.
The first evidence ofriskfrom acute or chronic effects
forexposure tobenzene wasrecognized in 1900(13). Ac-
cording to OSHA, "the benzene-leukemia link was first
identified in 1897 in a report on the leukemia death ofa
workeroccupationally exposed to benzene" (14). Winslow
recommended a 100-ppm exposure limitin 1927(15). Ben-
zene'slongregulatory historybegan in 1934, when Mas-
sachusetts established a Division of Occupational Hy-
giene in its Department of Labor and Industries (16) to
investigate benzene toxicity. BaseduponreportsbyBow-
ditch, Hunter, Mallory, and Elkins (17), it set a "maxi-
mumacceptable limit" (MAC)of75ppm, which was soon
reduced to 35 ppm.
In 1946, the American Conference ofGovernment In-
dustrial Hygienists (ACGIH) recommended a threshold
limit value (TLV) of 100 ppm forbenzene, which was lo-
wered to 35ppmin 1948 and25ppm in 1963(18). In 1971,
OSHA adopted the voluntary industrial limit of 10ppm,
setby theAmerican National Standards Institute(ANSI)
as part of its acceptance of "national consensus stan-
dards" (19). In that same year, the International Labor
Office (ILO), a specialized agency ofthe United Nations,
adopted ILO Conventionnumber 136, "Convention Con-
cerningProtection Against Hazards Arising From Ben-
zene," whichincorporated the ACGIH's standardand set
an international ceiling of 25 ppm for occupational ex-
posure.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) issued a criteria document concerning
the possible linkbetween leukemia and benzene in 1974
(updated in 1976). Arequestforan emergency temporary
standard(ETS)toregulate occupational exposure toben-
zene (20) was filed in 1976, followed by further informa-
tionfromthe NationalAcademyofSciences(NAS),which
concluded that "benzene must be considered a suspect
leukemogen" (21). These conclusions, combined with the
NIOSH recommendation, prompted OSHA to issue
voluntary guidelines that limited the TWA to 1 ppm in
1977(22). OSHAthen issued an ETS(whichwas defeated
in the courts)followed byaproposedpermanent standard
(23). After extensive hearings that discussed scientific
evidence in detail, OSHAissued its firstfinal ruleforthe
regulation ofbenzene ih February 1978 (24).
The first finalrulewas challengedbylabor unions and
bythe chemicalindustry, iron and steelindustry, rubber
manufacturers, individual companies, andthe petroleum
industry(25). The rule wasvacatedbythe U.S. Supreme
Court, in Industrial Union Department v. American
PetroleumInstitute(referred to as the Benzene Case)(26)
in 1980. Accordingto OSHA(27), the second rulemaking
wasinitiatedinresponse to apetition to OSHAbylabor
organizations in 1984, requesting a new standard to fill
the void created in the wake of the Benzene Case.
OSHA's failure toprovide atimelyresponse tothatpe-
tition gave rise to a petition in the federal courts, for a
writ ofmandamus in 1985. (If the petition before the
courts had succeeded, a writ ofmandamus would have
compelled OSHA to progress with the rulemaking pro-
cess under the threat of contempt of court.) Instead,
OSHA setforth aproposalforarulemakingto modifythe
benzene standard within 14 months (28) (1986), which
defeated thelaborunion'spetition. OSHA conducted its
secondbenzene rulemakingin 1986. In September 1987,
OSHA issued the present rule for benzene regulation.
Ironically, this standardprovides similarprotections com-
paredtothemodified original rule, butbecamelawwith-
out further court review (28).
Law of "Significant Risk" under
the Benzene Case
In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the valid-
ity ofOSHA's decision tolowerbenzene's PEL to 1 ppm
(fromtheprevious standardof10ppm)andvacatedapor-
tion of the revised standard governing the 1 ppm PEL
ambientworkenvironment(29). In theBenzene Casethe
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seminal issue before the Court concerned whether the
evidence in the recordprovided a sufficientbasisformore
stringent protection against benzene exposure. The
Court held that the standard was invalid because it was
based onfindings unsupported by the administrative rec-
ord (30).
The most important feature of the Court's long and
divided opinions is its quest for administrative account-
ability: an unanswered demand for a sound rationale
based on "substantial evidence," in the agency's record.
Without passingjudgment upon the specific details ofthe
scientific studies in the record, the Court found that
OSHA failed to demonstrate that it had performed a
"balancing test"; this rendered OSHA'spresumption of
"no safe level" inadequate to support modification in the
pre-existing standard.
The day after the opinion waspublished, the Washing-
ton Post reported (31) "industrial elation and regulatory
panic," because issues raised in the Benzene Case echoed
those faced by other agencies who grapple with public
health and science policy. Since then, the Benzene Case
has beeninterpreted to support a wide spectrum oflegal
principles regarding administrative duties at the inter-
face between law and science. It actually presented the
Court with a narrow issue regarding the agency's burden
of proof when changing an existing standard: What
course of action is appropriate when the full extent of a
risk is unknown? (32)
In the Court's view, such action required the agency to
first establish with great certainty that there would be
amajor saving oflives, health care costs, or quantifiable
economic costs in order tojustify modification ofthe ex-
istinglaw. Although the Court imposed the requirement
that OSHA make a threshold findingof"significant risk"
(33) upon the statutory mandate to provide protection "to
the extent feasible" as required by OSH Act s 6 (b) (5),
this finding was not intended to be a "mathematical
straightjacket" (34). Justice Stevens, writing for the
plurality, stated that OSHA has not made a threshold
finding ofrisk to satisfy the agency's burden ofproof. The
separate concurrences by ChiefJustice Berger and Jus-
tice Powell address the key issue ofOSHA's "burden of
proof' to acertaining the "feasibility" of a standard.
OSHA's 1978 benzene regulation was based on thebe-
liefthat there is "no safe level" for protection against a
carcinogen or a suspected carcinogen. OSHA applied its
overarching "Cancer Policy" (35) tojustify its view that
exposures must be reduced to the "lowest feasible level"
(36). That policy creates presumption under law that
there is "no safe level" of exposure for cancer-causing
agents. Under this construct, the agency instituted a
"risk-free" workplace policy, designed to apply
"technology-forcing" standards at "the frontiers of
science" (37), thereby instituting protections at the
"lowest feasible level" even ifthey were expensive, un-
necessary, or inappropriate for immediate application in
the field. Thus, the justification for changes in existing
benzene regulations was based upon anotherpolicy; not
scientific evidence pertaining to harms derived from ex-
posure to benzene at 10 ppm or less.
OSHA argued in the Supreme Court, as it did before
the lower court, "that it was the agency's position that
for regulatory purposes, where a safe threshold for ex-
posure to carcinogens was not demonstrated, it would as-
sume that none existed . . . [OSHA] cannot await scien-
tific resolution of the issue but has a mandate to act
now ... and in the absence of... no-effect levels or safe
levels to assume thatnone exist" (38). OSHA setforth the
view that its statutory mission required fostering "tech-
nological feasibility" over economic concerns. This ap-
proach was endorsed in the lower court by the inter-
venors (a concerned party that was not named in the
case), that "since no safe level ofexposure to benzene can
be determined, the Secretaryproperly concluded that un-
der OSH Act's legislative policy, the PEL should be set
at the lowestfeasible point" (39) based upon the agency's
statutory mandate to use the "best available evidence,"
and the "latest available scientific data in the field," to
assure "that no employee will suffer material impairment
ofhealth . .. for the period ofhis working life" pursuant
to s. 6 (b) (5) (40).
In response to the regulatory changes, industries af-
fected by the rule maintained that OSHA's failure to
demonstrate the "appreciable benefits" of the revised
consensus standard rendered such revision contrary to
the precepts of U.S. administrative law. In their view,
the term "feasible" wa's limited by economic constraints,
in contrast to OSHA's view that "feasible" means tech-
nologically achievable. Pointing to OSH Act's statutory
language in s. 6(b)(5), industries successfully argued that
OSHA standards must be "economically feasible" for the
regulated industry. Furthermore, they interpreted the
term "feasible" in s. 6(b)(5) ofOSH Act to included finan-
cial costs of implementing engineering controls or new
forms ofprotection for workers, which had not been con-
templated when the statute was written (41). The Court
was not persuaded by either view. It stated (42):
[OSH Act] requires the Secretary, before issuinig any standard,
to determiine that it is reasonably niecessar-y anid apprcopr-iate to
remedy a signiificantt risk of material health impairment. Only
after the Secretary has made the threshold determination that
such a risk exists with respect to a toxic substance, would it be
necessary to decide whether s6 (b) (5) requires him to select the
most protective standard he can consistent with economic and
technological feasibility ... Because the Secretary did not make
the required threshold findling in this case, we have no occasion
to determine wN-hether costs must be weighted against benefits
in an appropriate case. [Emphasis adldled.]
The Court agreed with OSHA's critics, who charged
that OSHA's "risk-free" approach to regulation was im-
practical and presented an undue burden upon em-
ployers, workers, and commerce. Bearing in mind that an
agency's primary task is to create policies and make dif-
ficult decisions, the Court was prepared to "accord
OSHAgreatleeway," and defer to its scientific expertise
if OSHA's policy reasons proved, on balance, to be sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Thus, the Court rea-
soned, it was unnecessary to reach the issue of cost-
benefit analysis.
301J. L. FEITSHANS
Even when considered in light of OSHA's statutory
purpose and the requirement of s 6 (g) to promulgate
standards "with due regard to the urgency" ofthe risk,
however, OSHA's contention that its enablinglegislation
required a "risk-free workplace" could not be justified
(43) because OSHA had not shown the direct, logical
correlation between the information inthe record andthe
agency's own findings. Without suchevidence in therec-
ord to provide substantial evidence for the regulations'
underpinnings, this fine thread ofreasoningwas also ab-
sent from the agency's conclusions. In the absence of a
clear nexus between the evidence in the record and the
conclusions in support of agency actions, the Supreme
Court declared the benzene regulations invalid.
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's re-
quirement that OSHA mustfind, "as athreshold matter
that the toxic substance in question poses a significant
health risk in the workplace and that a new, lower stan-
dard is therefore 'reasonably necessary and appropri-
ate' " (44) and that "the lack of substantial evidence of
discernible benefits is highlighted when one considers
that OSHA is unable to point to any empirical evidence
documenting leukemia risk at 10 ppm even though that
has been the permissible exposure limit since 1971" (45).
It also found that the absence ofsound statistical projec-
tions did not meet the test for "reasonably necessary"
regulations.
Since OSHA's case was premised upon the beliefthat
ithad statutory authorityto compel employers toprovide
a "risk-free" workplace, the Supreme Court tookpartic-
ular exception to the fact that "OSHA did not ask for
comments as towhether ornotbenzene presented a sig-
nificant health risk at exposures of 10 ppm or less.
Rather, it askedfor comments as to whether 1 ppm was
the minimum feasible exposure limit" (46). This approach
gaverise to several assumptionsbyOSHAregardingthe
absence ofany safe level ofexposure. In effect, the Su-
preme Court reasoned, "itwasinfactirrelevantwhether
there was any evidence at all of a leukemia risk at 10
ppm" (47).
Without further guidance from OSHA, the Supreme
Court wasobliged to engagein "statutory construction",
(a form of legal analysis) to interpret "feasible." Con-
fronted with a situation where the Supreme Court could
notrelyupon administrative criteriato evaluate "science
issues," it sought amiddle ground byrequiringafinding
or "significant risk" to be determined by the agency it-
self. In the alternative, the Supreme Court could have
declaredthe statute invalid(asJustice Rehnquistargued
inhis opinion, concurringinpart and dissentinginpart).
Although the Supreme Court refused to construe the
term "feasible" as requiring an economic cost-benefit
analysis, it was compelled to forge a new standard of
feasibility, based upon "significant risk" ofharm (48) as
measured against quantifiedbenefits, in order to "save"
the statute from "overbroad" delegation (49), which
would have rendered it unconstitutional.
The Supreme Courttherefore adopted a concept ofrisk
assessment, which isrequired ofotherregulatory agen-
cies, such as EPA andthe FDA. It isworthnoting, how-
ever, the Supreme Court didnot offerthe specific testin
an acceptable riskassessment, as lower courts had done
in the past. Nor did it offer the pretense that it should
provide such criteria to an agency that was charged by
lawwith developingthe expertise to create occupational
health standards. Rather, it gave a general description
ofthe two extremesthat could occur: too littleprotection
or too much protection.
The Supreme Court's many opinions in this case re-
volve about a single theme thatunifies the questions sur-
roundingthe accuracy ofthe agency's scientificfindings
and its legal burden ofproof. They reflect the Supreme
Court's underlyingneed to substitute its own viewofthe
inherently vague language ofthe OSH Actto fill the void
inadministrative action. "Sig-nificantrisk" andtherigors
ofprovidingvalid "scientific evidence" present a secon-
dary, albeit controversial aspect ofthe plurality opinion.
Although the need forjudges to understand science has
become the subject ofextensive debate, the Courtis com-
prised oflawyers, not scientists; it therefore considered
inappropriate forthe Court to "review" beyond the pro-
cedural aspects ofthe agency's scientific "fact-finding."
The Benzene Case provides a good example of the
courts' questfor substantial evidenceofagency decisions
when no safe level of exposure is recognized. Without
strongarguments specifictothefacts andcircumstances,
supporting thepromulgation ofthe 1 ppmbenzene stan-
dard, OSHA offered only "unclear" evidence to support
its actions. Failing to demonstrate the presence of a
balanced policy, the agency found itselfin an untenable
positionfromthe standpointofadministrative law, which
resulted in the Court's vacation of the standard.
Precedents Leading to the Benzene Case
Inprior cases, controversy surroundingthe criteriafor
appropriate actionby an agencydid notprecludefurther
judicial inquiry, despite the traditional "presumption" of
the validity ofagency conclusions. As the following dis-
cussion ofcaselaw demonstrates, several substantive and
procedural safeguards must be satisfied before a court
will deferto anagency'sexerciseofitsadministrative dis-
cretion. This presumption ofthe validity of an agency's
conclusions, in the face of partisan dissatisfaction with
such findings can be applied to areas ofscientific uncer-
tainty, if the agency demonstrates the fairness of its
proceedings and whether the information in the record
is reflected in the agency's regulatory conclusions.
In the Benzene Case, OSHA asserted that the burden
ofdisproving the validity ofarule mustbe borne by the
affected industries. The "Administrative Procedure Act"
(APA)(50), however, requires that aproponent ofarule
bears theburden ofprovingitsnecessity, unless there is
specific statutorylanguage to the contrary. In such cases,
the APA requirement in s556 can only be circumvented
through limited means, without undermining the sta-
tute'sconstitutionality. Forexample, there was statutory
language that shifted the burden ofproofto theindustry
inthe cases ofEnvironmental Defense Fundv. EPA (51)
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and Certified ColorManufacturers v. Matthews (52). In
both cases, the agency's enabling legislation clearlypro-
vided that there be apresumption that a substance was
unsafe unless proven otherwise. In contrast to the OSH
Act, the U.S. Congress expressly requiredthatmanufac-
turers ofpesticides certifythe safetyoftheirproductsbe-
fore the agency could approve theirregular use. OSHA,
however, does not have this statutory mandate.
The statutory authority challenged in Certified Color
Manufacturers prevents the use ofnew food additives,
unless the agency explicitly certified to the contrary af-
ter a hearing orrulemaking. In that case, the industrial
representatives brought suit challenging the FDA's ac-
tions, which terminated the provisional approval ofRed
Number2(pursuant to the transitional provisions ofnew
food additive amendments). Finding that the Secretary
didnot act "in excess ofstatutory authority," the appel-
late courtwouldnot substitute its ownjudgmentforthe
agency's conclusions and therefore deferred to the
agency's expertise.
The court's deference was contingentupon substantial
evidence that FDAhad infactmetitsburden ofreview-
ing and using the evidence in the record to give full and
fairconsideration ofthe pointsraised bythe industry. In
Certified ColorManufacturers, this was discerned using
the FDA's statutory criteria, whichprovidedvfortwo-step
decisionmaking. First, a substance was deemed unsafe
until proven otherwise. Then, the substance was listed
inanationalregistryifprovento (the Secretary's) satis-
faction that it was safe, (the so-called GRAS list).
The statutory authority is distinguishable from
OSHA'spolicyjudgmentthat there shouldbe apresump-
tion of no safe level as applied to the Benzene Case.
Nonetheless, the FDA model is useful because it high-
lightsthe kind ofinformationthat courtsrequesttomeet
aburden ofproof. FDAwasguidedbyexplicit statutory
criteria thatguidedits decisions, which includedpossible
harm or other relevant exposure from an additive; cu-
mulative effect ofthe regulated substance; safety factors
appropriate for animal experimentation data; and avail-
ability ofimplementation ofthe standard. Itisworthnot-
ingthat the last two components ofthese criteria evoke
an assessment ofthe risks and the costs ofimplementa-
tion. Inaddition, FDAwasboundby, and demonstrated
compliance with, its owncriteria, whichprovided further
justificationforitsrefusaltocertifythe safety ofthe food
additives in question.
When applying these criteria in Certified Color Man-
ufacturers, theAgency (FDA)necessarily struckthebal-
anceforweighingthepotential benefits toindustry(ofal-
lowing the use ofquestionably safe substances) against
the cost to society ifthe substance laterprovedtobehaz-
ardous. Despite this concomitant reduction in unques-
tioned aspects oftheagency'sburden ofproof(when com-
pared to vague allocation of the burden of proof under
OSHAct), the Courtnonetheless expressed a strongcon-
cernforthe quality ofthe Agency's scientific record. The
Court deferred to FDAonly after it had examinedboth
the content and procedures in the rulemaking record,
where iffoundclearevidence oftheriskofharm. Itgave
qualified deference to FDA's fact-finding, in dicta:
Consideringinteralia, that the information available to(the Sec-
retary) indicated a statistically significant relationship between
high doses ofthe additive and the occurrence ofcancerin ... rats,
the principle study did not establish safety, notice and comment
in APA were inapplicable (53).
One of the first decisions that denmanded evidence of
OSHA's administrative "expertise" heldinvalid anearly
OSHA standard that "set forth the requirement forthe
minimum number of lavatories in industrial establish-
ments"Associated Industries ofNew York State v. U.S.
Department ofLabor(54). InAssociatedIndustries, the
New York court reaffirmed the long-standing concept
that administrative determinations not supportedby sub-
stantial evidence need not be arbitrary and capricious.
Nonetheless, iffound that OSHA:
imposes a health standard upon industrial establishments that
is considerably more stringent than that which apparently has
been found satisfactory by many states . . . (OSHA)has an ob-
ligation to produce some evidence justifying its action. (55)
OSHAattempted tojustifyits actions inAssociatedIn-
dustries by asserting that the standard in question was
valid, pursuantto OSHA's statutoryauthority, torequire
thatworkplaces be "free fromrecognizedhazards" (56).
However, without substantial evidence relating to the
needforamore stringent standard, OSHA's arguments
seemed simplistic, orat best, weak enough to support vir-
tually any discretionary actionby an agency (regardless
ofinvalidity). Finding thatjudicial review was "exacer-
bated by the absence oflegitimate, nonpecuniary, artic-
ulated rationale for the standard in question," the court
concluded that when OSHA sought to institute a more
stringent standard, "andtheproposed standardhasbeen
contested on substantialgrounds, the agency hasthebur-
den ofoffering some explanation for adopting the Stan-
dard" (57).
In Society ofPlastic Industries Inc. v. OSHA (SPI)
(58), the New York court considered that OSHA had as-
sumed alegislative rolebecause, "thoughthe factualfin-
gerpoints, it doesnot conclude"(59). CitingIUDv.Hodg-
son (which upheld OSHA's use of administrative
discretion when formulating its asbestos regulations as
discussed in Part E, below), the court held that:
where explicit factual finding ofsafe is not possible, and the act
ofdecision is essentially a prediction based upon pure legislative
judgment, as when a Congressman decides to vote for or against
aparticularbill [the Court looks to the record, to determine] ...
Whetherthe agency, given an essentiallylegislative task to per-
form has carried it out in a mannercalculated to negate the dan-
ger of arbitrariness and irrationality. (60)
The Court undertook the "prodigious task" of study-
ing the 4000 page record, which it criticized as:
aggrevated duplications oftestimony, irrelevant exhibitsandlet-
ters, and almost illegible . . . and a general blunderbuss ap-
proach ... (60)
Nonetheless, in SPI, when the court looked with
"alarm" upon the "morbid" chronology ofvinyl chloride
exposure, unchecked by industry, even after the causal
relation between occupational exposure and increased
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morbidity was widelyrecognized, it wascompelled to ac-
cept the agency's findings. Having demonstrated to the
satisfaction ofthe courtthe existence ofa "serioushealth
risk" (61)based uponinformationreported to NIOSH and
independent researchbyothers, the courtfoundOSHA's
view persuasive, stating:
it must be remembered that we are dealing here with human
lives ... it remains the duty ofthe Secretary to act even in
circumstances where existing methodology or research is defi-
cient. (62)
Therefore, the urgency ofthe threat toworker's health
combined with the Secretary's well-reasoned explana-
tions merited deference to OSHA's action.
This theme was repeated inAmerican Iron and Steel
Institute (AISI) v. OSHA ("AISI") (63) where the Court
took great care in distinguishing "determinations bot-
tomed on factual matters" from "non-factual legislative-
like policy decisions" (64). After reviewing NIOSH
testimony concerning the carcinogenicity of coke oven
emissions (65) andother datainthe record, the Court em-
ployed a five-step criteria to evaluate OSHA's determi-
nations. Ofthese 5 steps inthis process ofjudicialreview
(which concernedprocedural requirements as well as the
agency's rationale), two criteria demonstrate the sig-
nificance ofpolicy considerations (66). OSHA satisfied its
burden ofproofunder these criteriaby offeringsubstan-
tialevidence thatthere isabsolutely no safelevelfortoxic
coke oven emissions but that the reduced PEL would
have demonstrable health benefits.
There is a major distinction in OSHA's use ofthe term
"no safe level" in AISI compared to the Benzene Case,
as the harms from coke oven emissions were an un-
disputed fact and there was evidence in the record that
occupationally induced mortality could be improved by
reducing occupational exposure to coke oven emissions.
In fact, acceptance ofthisfact, amongindustries as well
asregulatory authorities, served asthebasicrationalefor
enforcing a stringent performance standard. The viabil-
ity ofOSHA's standard, whose efficacy was established
throughthe use of adose-response relationship, therefore
was the sole scientific question before the court.
Thus, AISI's refusal to institute occupational health
protections despite an undisputed and quantified riskof
cancer was farless defensible than API's contention that
costly engineering controls to meet OSHA's require-
ments in the face ofuncertain risk would "bankrupt the
industry." When viewed in light of this precedent,
OSHA's arguments could not withstand strict scrutiny
to prevail in the Benzene Case.
Impact of the Benzene Case Upon OSHA
Case Law and New Standards
The Benzene decision had important ramifications for
all subsequent OSHA standards. Despite the Court's
strict scrutiny of OSHA's decisions (which called into
question OSHA' statutory authority), the findings
nonetheless upheld the notion that benzene is an ap-
propriate substance forregulation and set the tonefor ac-
ceptance ofsimilarstandardsinthe U.S. and abroad. Ad-
ditionally, the decisionbecamethe touchstone forfurther
evaluation ofthe role ofrisk assessment in lieu of cost-
benefit analysis within OSHA's regulatory process.
The ensuing debate regarding the importance of eco-
nomic considerations (despite the prohibitions against
cost-benefit analysis under OSH Act) has overshadowed
the Court's rejection of this notion, because of a new,
cost-containing regulatory outlook, and Executive Order,
andincreasedoversightby OMB. Theimpact ofthe Ben-
zene Caseuponfuture standardspromulgated by OSHA
is nonetheless evident in the Agency's increased ability
to demonstrate the policy rationale behind its actions.
For example, inthe case ofthe Building Construction
Trades Dept (AFL-CIO) v. Brock ("Building Trades")
(67) decided in February, 1988, the CourtofAppealsup-
heldmostofOSHA'smodifications tothepre-existingas-
bestos standard. In Building Trades, the DC Court of
Appeals reviewed the modifications ofOSHA's asbestos
standard, which reduced the prior PEL to 0.2 and the
STEL through work practice and engineering controls
exceptfor subgroups in the construction trades. OSHA's
banonthe sprayingofasbestos-containing products, how-
ever, was not upheld (68).
This was the second Court of Appeals case that
challenged OSHA's rulemaking for asbestos; the first
round of litigation began with OSHA's initial asbestos
standard in 1974 (69). In IUDv. Hodgson(70), the court
examined whether OSHAhadauthorityto institute con-
trols for occupational exposure to asbestos that were
mandatedby statute, (i.e., recordkeeping and medicalex-
aminations) (71). The court reluctantly upheld OSHA's
exercise ofauthorityto establish such controls andto set
the time frame for their implementation, stating, "the
record, examined closelyin relation to the relevant con-
cerns ofthe Act leaves nagging questions-even for the
inexpert observer-as tothereasons andrationaleforthe
Secretary's particular choices" (72).
In Building Trades, the same courtreviewedthe same
agency's actionsregardingthe same substance, 15years
later. The opinion in Building Trades is therefore strik-
ing in its complexity and its sophisticated evaluation of
scientific data (73). By contrast to Hodgson's simplistic
viewthat "technologicalprogressinindustryappearsnot
to have been accompanied uniformly by corresponding
reductions inthehealth hazards" (74),the courtinBuild-
ing Trades madefrequentreferencestoepidemiologyand
discussed throughoutits opinion such nonlegal concepts
as odds ratios, standard mortality, and proportionate
mortality (75). It also included in the body ofits opinion
a chart that shows the relative risk for smokers versus
nonsmokers who areoccupationallyexposed to asbestos
over aworkinglifetime. The courtfurther stated "Even
under the assumption ofa20yearworkinglife, [OSHA]
foundtherisk atthe existing PEL tobe 44 extra cancer
deaths per 1000" (76). It therefore accepted OSHA's
threshold determinationthat even atreducedlevelsthere
exists a significant risk, which would be measurably
reduced by implementation ofthe modified standard.
OSHA'spositionregardingitsthresholdfindingsofrisk
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due to occupational exposure to asbestos were based
uponits interpretation ofthe Benzene Case. Althoughthe
agency chose to apply a very narrowinterpretation ofthe
"significant risk" doctrine, the courtwas satisfiedbythis
approach. It deferred, inlargepart, to the agency's find-
ings except when the terminology used by the agency
was unduly vague(7?). The court's refusal to accept aban
on the spraying ofproducts that contain asbestos andits
desire for a clearer definition ofthe phrase "any kind of
construction work" (77) when determining the scope of
exemptions from the standard represent two instances
where the absence of evidence in the record compelled
the court to reject OSHA's policy.
The court agreed with OSHA, however, that despite
the synergistic relationship between asbestos and smok-
ingwhichincreasedthe workersrisk, therewasnojustifi-
cation to require that employers institute an outright ban
on smokingbyallpersonswhoface occupational exposure
to asbestos (78).
Thelanguage usedby the court throughout the Build-
ing Trade opinion (which concerns modified asbestos
regulations) closelyresembles the preamble to the pres-
ent (second) final benzene regulation, issued only a few
months before the Building Trades decision (79). The
benzene regulations' preamble reflects a heightened
awareness oftechnical matters to support QSHA's "de-
termination by the Assistant Secretary that employees
exposed to benzene face asignificant heightened riskand
thatthis standardwill substantially reduce thatrisk" (80).
The agency's use oftechnical language and its long dis-
cussion ofwhether benzene is an initiator or apromoter
(81) is clearly derived from the Benzene Case, which was
cited in the preamble (82).
For example, OSHA described the "extended and up-
graded" workin studiesby Infante and Rinsky(case con-
trol andretrospective studies ofrefinery workers) andby
Aksoy(leukemiaandpancytopenia among shoe workers
in Istanbul (83), as well as major developments in new
studies(84). These and other studieswere assessedbyan
outside consultant for OSHA. In addition, the lengthy
preamble discussed standard mortality ratios and the
findings ofstudies on rats and mice and concluded, "the
newstandardcreates aminimum reductionin excessrisk
of90%o [whichwill]prevent aminimumof326 deathsfrom
leukemiaover45years" (85). This newapproachindicates
a concernfor the evidentiaryunderpinnings at the heart
of the Benzene Case.
U.S. Benzene Law Compared to
Regulations Around the World
The increasingprevalence ofconventions, agreements,
and statutes regarding the use of benzene around the
world merits close attention. Although the information
currently available is sparse incontrasttothe voluminous
records in the U.S., the existence of such laws under-
scoresthatthe U.S. ismerely one amongseveralnations
thatrecognize theneed toregulate occupational exposure
to benzene and otherhazardous substances. This section
thereforebriefly summarizes informationfromthe Inter-
national Labor Force (ILO), World Health Organization
(WHO) European Region, and Canada[information from
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
and from developing countries will be discussed in a fu-
ture article].
Probably the most widely known of the international
standards regulating benzene is C.136, which was devel-
oped by the ILO. Founded in 1919 under the Treaty of
Versailles (86), the ILO encourages dialoguebetween less
developed and industrialized nations and promotes in-
creased interaction and coordinated activitybetween em-
ployers, governments, and workers (ortheir representa-
tive organizations). Accordingto the fundamental tenets
ofthe ILO Constitution(8?), occupational health is ahu-
man right; the amelioration ofworking conditions is one
ofthe ILO's oldest goals. To foster the implementation
of this goal, the ILO provides technical assistance and
prepares conventions that are adopted and ratified by
member nations (88).
C. 136 ("Convention Concerning Protection Against
Hazards ArisingFrom Benzene") provides a regulatory
framework for different economic settings and covers a
wide spectrum ofoccupational exposures. It covers all ac-
tivities that give rise to occupational exposure to ben-
zene, aswell asproductsthatcontain 1%benzenebyvol-
ume. Art. 2 requires stibstitution ofproducts containing
benzene whenever possible. Art. 4 prohibits use ofben-
zene in certain work processes at the discretion of the
competent authorities (89). Competent authorities may
permit exception to the percentage requirements or
other provisions after tripartite consultation.
Members who ratify C.136 also undertake to passlaws
and regulations consistent with it and to provide ap-
propriate inspection services and supervision to carry out
the purposes ofthe convention, except that no nation is
bound to requirements that violate their own constitu-
tionallaw. Members are alsofree to institute more strin-
gent protections to achieve these goals.
Asin the case ofmany ILO standards, C. 136Art. 5 re-
quiresoccupationalhygiene andtechnical measures to en-
sure effectiveprotection, but does notspecify the nature,
.methodology for monitoring, or extent of such protec-
tions. Presumably, engineering controls and the use of
respirators may be appropriate for protection to imple-
mentthis standard dependinguponthe circumstances at
the worksite. C. 136 also requires that measures betaken
to prevent the escape ofbenzene vapors into the air in
places of employment and in Art. 6, s. 2 that the "com-
petentauthority" shall fix a "ceilingvalue"forexposure,
which shall notexceed 25ppmusingmeasurements speci-
fied by that authority. The standard does not, however,
list a TWA.
The standard also requires in Art. 7 that "as far as
practible," workers shallhave adequate means ofprotec-
tion against skin contact. Medical surveillance provisions
include but are notlimitedto:preemploymentmedical ex-
amination, (fitness andbloodtest)periodicreexamination,
and removal of pregnant women and nursing mothers
from employment. The latter provision is probably the
most controversial, insofar as it raises important ques-
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tions atthe interface between occupational safety andjob
discrimination. Asinthe case ofall ILO standards, mem-
ber states agree to report annuallyupon their effects to
implement and comply with the convention's provisions.
Although there are no cases at the present time that
pertain specifically to the benzene convention, the ILO
also provides for an elaborate oversight mechanism and
grievance procedure in the event ofviolation of a stan-
dard after it has been ratified by a nation. And, in rare
cases ofegregious behavior, a nation's compliance with
international standards maybe calledinto question atthe
annual International Labor Conference(ILC), evenifthe
offendingnation has not ratified the convention. This con-
ceptof"entryintoforce" isanimportantand highlycon-
troversial aspect ofinternational law. For the purposes
of benzene regulation, however, this concept holds
greater implications for nations who have not created
standards oftheir own, ratherthan tonations who have
exercised theirpower infavor ofregulation. Employers
who seekto protect theiremployees innationswhere no
standards presently exist also are affectedby the inter-
national benzene standard.
The European Economic Community(EEC)instituted
community-wide standards for the transport and han-
dling of toxic substances that became effective in the
early 1980s. Like most EEC agreements, the standards
function as atreatybut also espouseprinciples thatmany
ripen into customary internationallaw. While the trans-
port agreement does not specify exposure limits to toxic
substances, it does set forth requiredprocedures forthe
safe handling and use ofcovered substances in amanner
that closely resembles the subsequent labeling require-
ments under U.S. laws. By contrast, the WHO has pub-
lished AirQuality Guidelines, which state, "No safe level
for airborne benzene can be recommended, as ... there
is no known safe carcinogenic level" (90). Unlike stan-
dards, however, these guidelines are not designed to be
apartofinternational law. Rather, theyreflectthe scien-
tific consensus regarding specific substances, including
benzene, followingWHO's constitutionalmandate topro-
tect and promote health around the world (91).
Last, Canada's province ofOntario provides an exam-
ple ofregional benzene regulations that reflect state-of-
the-art science and involvement by government, em-
ployers, and workers, consistent with the ILO's model.
Thepattern ofconsultationbetweenthesepartiesresem-
bles the structure contemplated in the ILO Convention
and its constitution. In addition, these benzene regula-
tions, passed in 1984, require respirators whenever en-
gineering controls are not available "to the lowestprac-
tible level" (92).
These examples highlight the growing international
consensus that occupational exposure to toxic orhazard-
ous substances is aproper subject fornational, transna-
tional, and even international regulation.
Conclusions
Benzene has become as ubiquitous in law as it is in in-
dustry due to protracted litigation and pervasive regu-
lation. Although regulatory agencies havelimitedpower,
it is unrealistic to expect that interest in regulation will
soon diminish orthattheplethora ofexisting regulations
willbe reducedintheir scope orrigor. Indeed, the regu-
latorytrend istowardmore stringentregulationthrough
the adoption of more conservative, scientifically based
preventative measures. Suchregulations are more likely
towithstandjudicial scrutiny and remainenforceable as
widely acceptednorms before national fora andunderin-
ternational law.
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MD, and Professor Theodore A. Feitshans, North Carolina State Uni-
versity, Raleigh, NC, for their encouragement, which made this paper
possible.
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